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Introduction 
The market for corporate control has played and still plays an important role 
in Britain and the United States, where bidders make tender offers to 
shareholders of target firms in order to obtain control of the firm and replace 
existing management. Continental Europe has not to the same extent laid 
the ground for a struggle between the existing management and active 
shareholders, seeking full control of the firm through tender offers and proxy 
fights. This difference is just one out of several that reflects a fundamental 
difference between the Anglo-American and the Continental European 
corporate governance system, although there is a tendency towards 
convergence. Thus, the European Union has attempted to harmonize the 
legislation towards the Anglo-American principle of “one share-one vote” and 
mandatory tender offers through the 5th and 13th  Directives, in order to 
promote a free market of goods and services, including companies.  
Even though all EU member states now have implemented the 13th Directive 
of mandatory tender offers and equal treatment of shareholders, European 
countries have not yet adopted the principle of one share-one vote. For 
example on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange over half of the firms have 
shares with dual class voting rights. As a consequence, the number of 
contested takeovers in Denmark has been limited. This is not only the case 
for Denmark but also for the largest economy in EU, Germany, where no 
public hostile takeover bid has been successful (see Baums in Davis and 
Stapledon (1993)).  
The EU proposal will influence the ownership structure. This is because 
foundation ownership is very common on the Danish Stock Exchange.  
Abolishing shares with dual class voting rights would therefore require 
foundations to buy a larger proportion of the company’s shares to maintain 
control. It is doubtful whether the majority of the foundations have the 
necessary capital, and this would cause the foundations to lose control, 
thereby changing the ownership structure.  
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The management entrenchment hypothesis states that takeover defenses are 
initiated by the incumbent management that opportunistically seeks job 
protection (see Williamson (1975)). This view is supported by OECD which 
notice that “markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in 
an efficient and transparent manner. Anti-takeover devices should not be 
used to shield management from accountability” c.f. section I, E in OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance. 
Proponents of a market for majority votes argue that it may serve as a 
mechanism to solve the principal-agent problem where it serves as an arena 
in which managers compete for resources to manage (see Jensen and 
Ruback (1983)) and therefore may be regarded as a valuable asset (see 
Manne (1965)). Grossman and Hart (1980) develop a model where they show 
that it may be in the interest of minority shareholders to write a charter that 
explicitly permits dilution by paying an amount to the raider in case of a 
takeover. This is to overcome the problem of free-riding since present 
shareholders can free ride on the raider’s efforts to improve the firm. 
Although dilution reduces the price shareholders receive the tradeoff is 
between better management and a higher probability of takeovers versus a 
lower bid price and less residual income. In the discussion of an optimal 
corporate charter Grossmann and Hart (1987) present a model where they 
show that the principle of one share-one vote encourages to the selection of 
an efficient management team. However, they also notice that when private 
benefits are large, e.g. a family that receives significant private benefits from 
control, deviations from the one share-one vote principle may be optimal. In 
addition, Grossman and Hart (1980) also notice that when market 
participants are informed of a takeover attempt, the price will increase, 
thereby making the takeover less profitable for the raider. Potential raiders 
will anticipate this free rider problem, undermining the existence of a market 
for corporate control.  
Scharfstein (1988) presents a theory of the disciplinary role of takeovers. 
Based on a model with asymmetric information he argues that an informed 
raider can reduce incentive problems by making managerial compensation 
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more sensitive to information  unavailable to shareholders. Jensen (1992) 
argues that a market for corporate control is necessary to prevent the 
existing management from exploiting the free cash flow. The presence of 
various takeover defenses may therefore prevent the existence of a market 
that allocates control in which the management could be forced to surrender 
the free cash flow to the shareholders.  
The shareholder interest hypothesis on the other hand states that takeover 
defenses are required in order to align management’s incentives with respect 
to time horizon with those of shareholders (see Stein (1988) for a formal 
model). Takeover defenses may enable management to extract a higher price 
from the bidder in a takeover situation (see DeAngelo and Rice 1983).  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986a) argue that it is not always against the interests 
of existing shareholders to prevent takeover defenses. Based on a model they 
show that greenmail i.e. where the management buys out the raider in 
exchange of a standstill agreement, actually benefits existing shareholders. 
This is because excluding a bidder may be a way of inviting even better offers 
from other bidders later in the process, where it is assumed that 
management acts in the interest of shareholders. Schleifer and Vishny 
(1986b) show that takeovers sometimes may increase agency costs when the 
bidding management’s pay too much in order to obtain private benefits of 
control. Less enthusiastic about the market for corporate control are also 
Franks and Mayer (1990), who recognize that  there is a tradeoff. Takeovers 
may improve managerial incentives but only at the expense of long-term 
investment. The purpose of this article is to evaluate whether there are costs 
associated with takeover defenses that effectively block a market for 
corporate control formulating the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis: Companies without effective takeover defenses outperform 
companies where the management is effectively protected against a hostile 
takeover 
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The market for corporate control cannot be viewed independently of legal 
rules, since they to a very large extent determine the level of takeover 
activity. This is not only the case in Europe, but also in the U.S. where some 
states in order to attract companies have adopted takeover laws that could 
be of benefit for the existing management.  
Several modifications have to be emphasized concerning the effectiveness of 
takeovers as a corporate governance mechanism. First of all, such a market 
requires a liquid capital market to give potential bidders the capital required 
and this condition is probably not satisfied in many European countries, 
including Denmark 
The relationship between legal rules and the supply of external finance play 
a key role since countries with poor investor protection also have less 
developed capital markets (see La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer 
(1997)).  
In the article Danish data are used to test the above hypothesis. It will be 
shown that firms without effective takeover defenses do not significantly 
outperform protected firms.  The empirical results therefore indirectly 
support the shareholder interest hypothesis.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
section 3 describes Danish companies’ use of takeover defenses. Section 4 
describes the data and section 5 the applied model. Results are presented in 
section 6 while the robustness is examined in section 7. Section 8 gives 
some explanations  and the article concludes in section 9.   
 
2.  Literature 
 
Empirical studies using event study methodology find that value (market 
value of equity) is increased by mergers and acquisitions activity. But the 
gain, i.e. abnormal returns, of the acquiring firms is close to zero, whereas 
the positive gain to target firms is more substantial. (see Jensen and Ruback 
(1983) for a review of studies concerning takeovers and their impact).  
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Various studies have examined the reaction of the introduction of different 
takeover defenses on the share price, whereas literature is scarce concerning  
the relationship between takeover defenses and performance over time. The 
studies concerning the impact on share price of anti-takeover amendments 
have given mixed results. DeAngelo and Rice (1983) find negative, although 
insignificant, abnormal returns around anti-takeover amendments.  
Linn and McConnell (1983) reach the opposite results finding a positive and 
significant positive effect on share prices. Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) find on 
average an insignificant effect on the value of announcing firms’ shares. 
However, they show that different types of amendments have varying effects. 
Non-fair price amendments have an average significant negative effect of 
2.95 % on share prices, while fair prices have an insignificant effect. 
Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (1992) examine the state intervention in the market 
for corporate control by the case of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 of 1990. 
The law prohibits shareholders from exercising their basic rights as owners 
of the firm and thus eliminates the traditional fiduciary obligation of the 
board of directors to promote shareholders’ interests. They find that the 
legislation significantly decreased share values, but firms with anti-takeover 
charter amendments already in place were less effected. 
There are several problems associated with event studies. Especially caused 
by the fact that using the proxy date as the event day does not recognize that 
possible information about a forthcoming anti-takeover amendment very 
often already is disclosed. Few studies therefore conduct a post-
announcement performance examination of the introduction of takeover 
defenses.  
Using a two-factor model Langetieg (1978) finds that post merger excess 
return is insignificantly different from zero. Johnson and Rao (1997) find 
that anti-takeover amendments do not have negative effects in terms of their 
impact on various fundamental firm financial ratios.  
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3.  Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms 
 
The organization of the management in Danish firms differs from the Anglo-
American system, in particular by having two-tier boards like Germany. The 
supervisory board represents the shareholders and monitors the board of 
managing directors and has the power to decide in cases of extraordinary 
matters or of major importance (c.f. § 54 in the Company Act). The 
supervisory board must not be dominated by the managing directors (c.f. § 
51). The members of the supervisory board typically meet once a month and 
the daily management of the firm is carried out through the board of 
managing directors.  
Danish takeover defenses are characterized by being permanent. Contrary to 
the U.S. system they do not become active when a takeover is immediately 
forthcoming. Danish takeover defenses are stipulated in the corporate 
charter or articles of incorporation as shark repellents apart from golden 
parachutes. Golden parachutes only play a minor role as an instrument to 
prevent a takeover by Danish firms, although it is difficult to asses for 
certain, since golden parachutes are not reported to the public. Golden 
parachutes for the benefit of the management could constitute a violation of 
the Company Act on fair treatment and duty of loyalty, if the payment exceed 
what would be necessary to give the board a fair compensation in the event 
of a removal. It is also dubious how effective golden parachutes are as 
takeover defenses. One could argue that golden parachutes may actually 
promote takeovers since they reduce the existing management’s resistance 
towards a takeover in which management is rewarded with golden 
parachutes. 
Table I shows that Danish firms have adopted takeover defenses that are 
considerably different from both U.S. and British firms, although they are 
similar to takeover defenses adopted by other firms located in the EU (see 
Stonehill and Dullum (1990)).  
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Table I. Descriptive statistics of potential takeover defenses for the sample set 
of 102 Danish firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange.  
 
     Category                                                                            Percentage 
 
a)  Ownership limitations                                                             2,9 
b)  Voting rights limitations                                                          4,9 
c)  Clause of interests                                                                   5,9 
d)  Temporarily suspension of voting rights                                 9,8 
e)  Dual class voting rights                                                            51,0 
f)  Right of preemption concerning A-shares                                9,8 
g)  Approval of transfer concerning A-shares                             12,7 
h)  Trust dominants ( > 50 % of the votes)                                  21,6 
i)  Statutory voting majority, different from 2/3                           2,9 
 
(See appendix for a description of each firm’s takeover defenses)  
 
It should be mentioned that the presence of dual class voting rights does not 
necessarily constitute a takeover defense by itself (c.f. the definition of an 
effective takeover defense in the end of this section). Table I contains a 
description of the most common and applicable takeover defenses accessible 
to the management in the target firm (see Schans Christensen (1991) for a 
comparative description of specific defensive devices and strategies in 
Danish law and also Rose (2001) for detailed legal analysis of potential 
takeover defenses by Danish firms).  
The first two categories of takeover defenses (a and b) consist of limitations of 
ownership and voting rights which are almost completely absent in the U.S. 
Even though they are not so widespread in the sample (nearly 8 percent) 
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they are very effective devices in order to insulate the existing management 
from hostile takeovers. Since the Danish Company Act requires that these 
arrangements have to be approved at the general meeting by statutory voting 
majority of 9/10 (c.f. § 79) such agreements would almost be practically 
impossible to implement now a days. They are a legacy from the past very 
often inspired from the co-operative movement where such provisions were 
common and ideas concerning corporate governance were almost non-
existing.    
The term clause of interest (c) stipulated in the corporate charter means that 
shareholders who have agreed to coordinate their votes on a specific matter 
are regarded as only one shareholder concerning the number of votes. Such 
a provision is often stipulated in order to avoid a loophole concerning 
ownership and voting limitations. Almost six percent have adopted such a 
clause and it serves the same purpose as voting and ownership limitations 
representing a serious restraint in achieving a functioning market for 
corporate control. 
Temporarily suspension of voting rights  (d) after the acquirer has bought the 
shares is another device to make a takeover difficult. Nearly ten percent of 
Danish firms have adopted such provisions where the suspension typically 
last one or three months. Since the acquirer has to report his holdings of 
shares to the company every time he obtains a change of five percent of the 
shares, this gives the management the necessary time to implement 
strategies to protect itself against the takeover. The management could for 
instance call for an extraordinary general meeting and present proposals 
that could prevent the acquirer from gaining full control of the firm.  
Dual class voting rights (e) are adopted by more than half of the companies 
and represents a large deviation from the U.S. firms use of takeover 
defenses, although dual class voting rights are not absent in the U.S. (see 
the SEC Rule 19c-4). Very often a foundation or trust holds the majority of 
the A-shares with superior voting rights and blocks for a takeover, while the 
B-shares are freely traded.  
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The Danish Company Act provides that no shares may bear more than 10 
times the voting value of any other share of the same category (c.f. § 67). 
Whether dual class voting rights should be allowed is still a controversial 
question (see e.g. Lando (1991) and Niels Chr. Nielsen and Ebbesen (1994)). 
The question cannot be viewed independently but must be seen in 
conjecture with the ownership structure, in particular the extension of trust 
or foundation ownership, which vary considerably within the EU (besides 
Denmark, foundation ownership is common in the Netherlands). In 
connection with dual class voting rights the corporate charter often states 
that when one of the existing A-shareholders wants to sell his holdings of A-
shares, the other A-shareholders have a right of preemption (f) i.e. to buy the 
shares at a fair price. This is the case for almost ten percent of the 
companies. Another possibility is to stipulate in the corporate charter that a 
transfer needs approva l (g) of the existing board of supervisors when an A-
shareholder wants to sell which is stipulated in almost 13 percent of the 
firms.  
While amendments of a corporation’s charter in the U.S. (Delaware) can be 
conducted by the board of directors on its own, such an action requires the 
approval of the shareholders on a general meeting which requires 2/3 
statutory voting majority (c.f. § 78) according to the Danish Company Act. 
Only very few companies use the possibility to deviate by increasing the 
majority fraction from the Companies Acts claim of statutory voting majority 
(i) of 2/3 (three percent). One reason might be that such a provision also 
could prevent the management from changing the corporate charter into 
other events than a hostile takeover, e.g. when it needs to change its 
purpose or place of incorporation. 
Almost 65 percent of the firms have adopted White knights i.e. a delegation to 
issue shares at market price without the shareholders right of preemption. 
The reason for not showing the fraction of white knights in table 1 is that it 
is questionable whether an action to issue shares at market price without 
the stockholder’s right of preemption would be in accordance with the 
Danish Company Act. Normally, such a decision would require a statutory 
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voting majority of 2/3 at the general meeting. The law permits that the 
shareholders can delegate the decision and the terms to the management 
(c.f. § 37). In principle, such an action is possible but as mentioned it could 
be in conflict with the Danish Company Act (c.f. § 63 and § 80). This is 
because this action would violate a principle of equality among the 
shareholders set forth in the Act and thus conflict with the general standard 
(duty of loyalty) also codified in the Company Act. The general standard 
states that the management may not pass any resolution which is obviously 
likely to result in undue advantage to certain shareholders or others at the 
expense of other shareholders or the company. Normally, a delegation to 
issue shares without the shareholder’s right of preemption is not supposed 
to serve as a takeover defense due to the mentioned considerations. Instead, 
companies very often in connection with a “friendly” acquisition use the 
delegation to issue shares without the existing shareholder’s right of 
preemption as a measure of payment instead of cash. Such a provision 
enables the management to obtain capital in a flexible manner.  
Poison pills are adapted by 5 percent of the firms, but it is also questionable 
whether the use of a delegation to issue shares lower than market price 
without all the shareholders’ right of preemption is possible under Danish 
law due to the same problems as mentioned above (see Gomard (1989) 
p.129). Thus, it is doubtful whether Poison puts or Green mail can be 
applied under Danish law in a takeover situation since a company can only 
acquire 10 percent of its own shares.  
Only under very extreme circumstances i.e. in a limited period if necessary 
to avoid considerable and threatening damages (c.f. § 48a). Since the 
shareholders can sell the shares at a high premium this would require a 
decision at the general meeting that exclusively has the right to approve the 
dividend (c.f. § 69).  
To test the formulated hypothesis empirically we need to define what we 
mean by effective takeover defenses. This article defines a company to have 
an efficient takeover defense, denoted by PROTEC if it satisfies the following 
characteristics; either the firm has 
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A) ownership limitations,  voting rights limitations or adopted a  clause of 
interest   
 
B) the company is dominated via dual class voting rights by a foundation 
(trust)     that holds the voting majority (over 50 percent).  
 
C) the company is also said to be efficiently protected if the A-shares with    
superior voting rights represent more that 50 percent in a company given 
that the corporate charter requires the board’s approval of transference 
or the other A- shareholders have a preemptive right of the A-shares. 30 
firms satisfy the above conditions (29 percent). 
 
Table II. Correlation Matrix of Danish firms’ takeover defenses (binary 
variables) 
 
 
 
The correlation matrix shows that there is a relatively high positive 
correlation between dual class voting rights and trust ownership (correlation 
of 0,31), which illustrates that trust ownership is mainly based on the use of 
dual class voting rights. Table II further shows that there is a high positive 
correlation between dual class voting rights and preemption rights as well as 
approval of transfer. On the other hand, there is a negative correlation 
between the latter two (correlation of -0,12), indicating that they substitute 
each other as legal provisions to avoid contested takeovers in association 
with dual class voting rights.  
Owner/voting limit. Appr. of transfer Preempt. right Trust ownersh. Dual class PROTEC
Owner/voting limit. 1,00
Appr. of transfer 0,04 1,00
Preemption right -0,08 -0,12 1,00
Trust ownership -0,16 -0,03 0,08 1,00
Dual class -0,25 0,30 0,26 0,31 1,00
PROTEC 0,39 0,43 0,37 0,21 0,29 1,00
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Table II also shows that the use of ownership/voting rights limitations is 
negatively correlated with dual class voting rights, trust ownership and 
preemption rights, indicating that firms which have adopted 
ownership/voting rights limitations will tend not to use other types of 
takeover defenses, since they already are effectively protected against 
takeovers.  
As expected, there is a high positive correlation between PROTEC and the 
other takeover defenses. It is interesting to note that a firm is not 
necessarily characterized as protected solely if it has dual class voting rights 
(correlation of 0.29). We notice that the EU proposal of one share-one vote 
will have serious effects on the Danish ownership structure, since the 
correlation between both trust ownership and dual class voting rights as 
well as PROTEC and trust ownership is relatively high.  
 
4. Data Material 
 
The data consists of all companies listed at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange 
in 1998. Banks, insurance companies and mutual funds are excluded since 
they possess industry specific features and are regulated by special laws. 
The few number of shipping companies are also excluded. The reason for 
excluding the shipping companies’ is that it is very difficult to obtain reliable 
information of the company’s financial status due to the non-transparent 
nature of the annual accounts and ownership structures. However, this 
means that the largest Danish company (Maersk or the A.P. Möller group 
which is dominated by two foundations) is excluded. A few computer and IT 
companies are also excluded because they differ from the rest of the sample 
and because their annual accounts do not constitute a reliable basis for any 
of the chosen performance measures.  
The information sources consist of the companies’ annual accounts 
concerning the five fiscal years 1995-1999 together with the articles of 
incorporation.  
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To uncover the presence of foundation ownership it has been necessary to 
use various public references since the Danish Accounting Act does not 
oblige the company to report the exact holdings of any foundations or other 
blockholders’ number of stocks.  Prices  are adjusted in order to obtain a 
reliable data set. They concern stock splits and new share issues and 
incorporate the effect of fully dilution. The value of any stock warrant or 
stock right is incorporated into the return and added to the dividends. The 
adjustments are made accordingly to the guidelines formulated by the 
Danish Association of Financial Analysts (Den Danske 
Finansanalytikerforening).  
 
5. The Model 
 
The model conducts a cross-sectional analysis using variables based on 
average numbers within a period of five years from 1995-1999, since any 
individual year  during the period could be biased.  
Firstly, one has to decide which performance measure to apply. Financial 
literature is rich on different performance measures, especially associated 
with the evaluation of portfolio performance (see e.g. Elton and Gruber 
(1995) ch. 24) even though there is not general consensus about the 
appropriate  measure to use. This is also the case when we deal with a 
measure of single firm performance, and as a consequence, the empirical 
part of corporate governance literature uses a whole basket of different firm 
performance measures. One way to asses a firm’s performance is to compare 
the actual return with the expected return, where the latter is generated 
from a selected equilibrium model e.g. APT or CAPM. This is sometimes 
referred to as Jensen’s Differential Performance Index (see Jensen (1969)). 
However, this approach has been criticized since it simultaneously involves a 
test of the selected equilibrium model (see e.g. Roll (1977) who argue that 
equilibrium theory is not testable unless the exact composition of the true 
market portfolio is known and used in the tests). 
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This article therefore uses four different performance measures; Tobin’s Q, 
stock return, Return on assets (ROA), and return on equity  (ROE). Actual 
stock return serves as a simple measure and does not incorporate the 
amount of capital invested or aspects concerning risk. Thus there is no 
theoretical basis for this performance measure although it is used in some of 
the literature of corporate governance.   
Tobin’s Q or the Q-ratio which is defined as the ratio of the market value of 
the firm’s securities to the replacement costs of its assets. Tobin’s Q serves 
as a general performance measure although it may be biased since the 
actual calculations use book value to measure the replacement value. This 
article calculates the Q-ratio as the market value of equity and book value of 
debt divided by the book value of assets. A high value for Q is usually a 
strong indication for valuable growth opportunities due to a strong 
competitive advantage (brand name or know-how). In spite of the fact that 
the Q-ratio may be difficult to interpret it plays an important role within the 
empirical part of corporate governance. An example is the theory of merger 
activity where Golbe & White (1987) use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for the 
bargains hypothesis, i.e. mergers rise when a firms assets price is low 
relative to the replacement value of assets.  
In addition, the article uses the most common performance measure of 
accounting profits. A firm’s ROA is usually a reasonable surrogate for its 
economic rate of return if the firm does not experience substantial positive or 
negative growth. Several factors may influence ROA such as risk, cycles in 
sales, product life cycles of the firm, capital intensity etc., although it is 
frequently applied to assess the profitability of the total invested capital. This 
article defines ROA as net income plus positive interests before tax divided 
by total assets.  
ROE is another measure of accounting profits which is closely related to 
ROA and financial leverage. Contrary to ROA, ROE explicitly measures 
performance from the viewpoint of the owners i.e. the shareholders. This 
article calculates ROE as annual income after tax divided by book equity at 
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the end of the year. Appendix A shows that all performance measures are 
relatively high positively correlated. 
To capture the cross-sectional variation in stock return two controls have 
been added. Fama and French (1992) find that size and the ratio, book 
equity to market equity both have a significant influence on average share 
return. They find that size is negatively related to stock return indicating 
that small firms perform relatively superior to large firms because of the risk 
represented by size. The ratio book-to-market equity is positively related to 
the stock return and they argue that one possible explanation could be that 
the ratio is equal to the relative distress factor. Firms which the market 
judges to have poor prospects, signaled by a low stock price and high ratios 
of book to market equity, have higher expected returns due to higher costs of 
capital than firms with strong prospects. However, Fama and French (1992) 
also noticed that it could simply reflect irrational market whims about the 
future prospects of firms (p. 429). To avoid problems associated with 
multicollinearity this model does not use the Fama and French’s measure of 
size (the natural log of market equity) but instead uses another although 
very frequently used measure for size, namely annual sales or turnover. 
 
Table III: Descriptive Statistics 
            Mean             Std. Error           Minimum            Maximum 
  TOBIN’S Q           4,354                3,748                   0,745               26,056 
  RETURN             8,780                21,902               -36,750             104,500 
  ROA                    8,798                 9,178                  -5,250              78,250 
  ROE                  10,223                25,097               -26,222              42,740 
  SALES           2624,492            4749,093                17,800          24813,600 
  BOOKMEQ          0,208                  0,217                  0,022                 1,86 
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In order to test the formulated hypothesis one could simply estimate a linear 
regression equation with the performance measures as dependent variables. 
The explanatory variables could consist of a dummy variable denoted 
PROTEC that equals one if the firm is defined as effectively protected against 
takeovers or otherwise zero, in combination with the two control variables.  
However, this approach would be bias since it assumes that the causation or 
causality runs from whether a firm is effectively protected or not to 
performance. But one could also argue that the causation runs in the 
opposite direction i.e. a firm’s performance influences whether it is protected 
or not. The problem of causation in empirical studies of corporate 
governance has within the last years received more attention. In particular, 
within empirical literature that examines the relation between managerial 
ownership and corporate financial performance.  
Simultaneous structural equation models have been increasingly applied 
because of the ability to model the causality between ownership and 
performance (this question should not be confound with exogeneity and the 
familiar concept of Granger causality in time-series analysis). To address the 
problem of causality researchers normally use simultaneous equation 
estimation, hereby constructing more that one equation. The system of 
equations may be estimated e.g. using instrumental variables and two stage 
least squares conditioned on the equations being identified.  
However, this approach only works well if there are no dummy variables 
serving as dependent variables. If this is the case, as in this article, 
Heckmann (1978) shows that the results are biased since the residuals of 
the equations are correlated with some of the independent variables. 
Heckmann constructs a model which allows consistent estimation and 
formulates some alternative estimators. Following Heckmann the model can 
be formulated as a system of two equations.  
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PERFORMi = a11i + a12SALESi + a13BOOKMEQi + b1Di + g1PROTEC*i + e1i         (1) 
 
 
PROTEC*i  = a21i + a22DUALCLi + a23FOUNDi  +  b2Di + g2PERFORMi + e2i          (2)   
 
 
The two endogenous variables, PERFORMi and PROTECi are supplemented by 
a set of predetermined variables which in this case solely consist of 
exogenous variables where the crucial characteristic of the predetermined 
variables is that they are independent of current and future disturbances. 
DUALCLi is a dummy that equals one if firms have shares with dual class 
voting rights. Otherwise it equals zero.  
FOUNDi is a dummy variable that equals one if a foundation or trust  
dominates the firm, otherwise it equals zero. PERFORMi represents  
performance of company i. PROTEC*i is a latent non-dummy variable that 
measures the protectiveness of the management against a contested 
takeover. Di is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if protectiveness 
exceeds a certain threshold, otherwise zero, according to the categorization 
in section 4. BOOKMEQi  is identical to book equity divided with market 
equity for firm i. SALESi  equals the annual sales of firm i.   
We see that the system is identified through exclusions since it obeys the so-
called order condition (see Johnston and Dinardo p. 312 (1997)).  The errors 
e i are assumed to satisfy the standard assumptions. Finally, to secure that 
equations (1) and (2) define a statistic model the principal assumption of 
Heckmann that g2b1 + b2 = 0 must be made. Appendix B describes how the 
parameters are estimated using an approach formulated by Heckmann (p. 
944). The following tables all show the results of the estimations of the first 
equation in the system, which is the equation of primary interests. In order 
to estimate the first equation, it must be transformed into expression (3) in 
the appendix. 
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The results in table IV show that both variables, D and PROTEC* are not 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that protected firms do not 
outperform unprotected firms. The ratio BOOKMEQ is indeed significantly 
different from zero which is due to the definition of the ratio that makes it 
correlated with the dependent variable. Larger firms, measured by sales, do 
not have significantly higher Tobin’s Q, neither do they outperform smaller 
firms. 
 
 Table IV: Regression estimates of TOBIN’S Q as the dependent variable and 
performance measure. 102 observations. The numbers in the parentheses are 
significance level. 
 
Independent variables:                1.                            2.                         3.  
 
CONSTANT                               5.866                       5.564.                      5.302 
                                     (0.000)                     (0.000)                    (0.000) 
 
SALES                                      0,001                        0,001                    
                                    (0.878)                      (0.117)                    
 
BOOKMEQ                              -6,734                         
                                               (0.002)                   
                                                
D                                              5.183                        8.168                    18.036 
                                               (0.751)                      ( 0,632)                   (0,261) 
 
PROTEC*                                -1.969                       -4.694                     -7,375 
                                               (0,707)                      (0.386)                    (0,156) 
 
Adj. R2                                                        0.18                          0.10                        0.07 
 
F-statistic (p-value)                  0,00                          0,02                        0.02 
 
 
Table V reports the results of the estimations when stock return serves as 
the dependent variable. Both D and PROTEC* are not significantly different 
from zero showing that it does not matter whether a firm is effectively 
protected against takeovers or not when the performance measure is share 
return. 
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Table V: Regression estimates of RETURN as the dependent variable and 
performance measure with 102 observations. The numbers in the parentheses 
are significance level. 
 
 
Independent variables:                1.                            2.                         3.  
 
CONSTANT                               15.139                     15.089                   12.596 
                                     (0,001)                      (0,001)                   (0,005) 
 
SALES                                      0,001                        0,001                    
                                    (0,027)                      (0,027)                    
 
BOOKMEQ                              -1,116                         
                                               (0,933)                   
                                                
D                                           -128,519                  -128,024                   -34,331 
                                               (0.208)                     ( 0,209)                     (0,722) 
 
PROTEC*                                33,365                      32.914                      7,451 
                                               (0,301)                      (0.308)                     (0,811) 
 
Adj. R2                                                        0.07                          0.07                        0.02 
 
F-statistic (p-value)                  0.12                          0.06                        0.59 
 
 
 
BOOKMEQ is not significantly different from zero either, but this is the case 
with SALES which has a positive sign and is significantly different from zero. 
Larger firms tend to have superior returns on average over the five-year 
period.  
Table VI displays the results when the dependent variable is ROA. Again, the 
results show that unprotected firms do not outperform protected firms since 
the variables D and PROTEC* are not significantly different from zero even 
though both variables are negative. None of the control variables are 
significant.  
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Table VI: Regression estimates of ROA as the dependent variable and 
performance measure. 102 observations. The numbers in the parentheses are 
significance level. 
 
 
Independent variables:                1.                            2.                         3.  
 
CONSTANT                               11.947                     11.564                   11.292 
                                     (0.000)                      (0.000)                   (0.000) 
 
SALES                                      0,002                        0,002                    
                                    (0,954)                      (0,517)                    
 
BOOKMEQ                              -8.540                         
                                               (0.126)                   
                                                
D                                             -4.405                      -6.618                      -9,606 
                                               (0.918)                     ( 0.988)                     (0,809) 
 
PROTEC*                                -0.029                       -3.483                     -6.262 
                                               (0,998)                      (0.797)                     (0,623) 
 
Adj. R2                                                        0.07                          0.05                        0.04 
 
F-statistic (p-value)                  0.13                          0.19                        0.12 
 
 
 
When we look at table VII which shows the results of the estimations when 
the dependent variable is ROE, we see the same tendency, namely that 
unprotected firms do not outperform protected firms since both variables D 
and PROTEC* are not significantly different from zero. Both SALES and 
BOOKMEQ are negative but not significant. 
In all situations the selected explanatory variables did not have a high 
explanatory power measured by the determination coefficient and the F 
statistics. This is not unusual in cross-sectional studies concerning 
individual firm performance. If one variable had a high explanatory power 
this will in an efficient market be exploited by market participants forcing 
the system back into equilibrium. 
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Table VII: Regression estimates of ROE as the dependent variable and 
performance measure with 102 observations. The numbers in the parentheses 
are significance level. 
 
 
Independent variables:                1.                            2.                         3.  
 
CONSTANT                               9.684                        9.797                      8.865 
                                     (0.007)                      (0.006)                   (0.008) 
 
SALES                                      -0,001  
                                     (0,883)  
 
BOOKMEQ                              -12.653                    -11.677                         
                                                (0.126)                       (0,409)    
                                                
D                                             -30.317                    -35.795                    -15.267 
                                                (0.801)                     ( 0.753)                     (0,891) 
 
PROTEC*                                14.578                       15.789                     6.895 
                                               (0.706)                      (0.674)                     (0,847) 
 
Adj. R2                                                        0.04                          0.04                        0.03 
 
F-statistic (p-value)                  0.23                          0.25                       0.25 
 
 
 
Summing up, we notice that all the performance measures do not depend on 
whether a firm is effectively protected against takeovers or not. This could be 
due to the selection of inappropriate performance measures. A more 
plausible explanation could be that other forces discipline managers in order 
to serve the interests of the shareholders and thereby boosting performance. 
In this light the results do not provide any evidence that management in 
effectively protected firms impose agency costs on shareholders. The results 
indicate that a market for corporate control is not a credible threat for the 
management in Danish listed firms, but the results do not show that 
protected firms’ performance is superior to unprotected firms, either.  
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7.  Robustness  
 
Adding dummies for industry effects only has a very small effect on the 
results since they have no significant impact on performance. This is 
probably because the Copenhagen Stock Exchange is dominated by a few 
very large companies that are  dominating within their own industry, e.g. 
Carlsberg within the brewery industry. Concentrated share holdings is 
another mechanism of reducing the agency costs associated with the free 
rider problem, since a substantial minority shareholder has the incentive to 
collect information and monitor the management (see Schleifer and Vishny 
(1986)).  
Several studies investigate the influence of ownership structure upon a 
firm’s financial structure and its performance (see  Short (1994) for a critical 
review). To control for the effects caused by large shareholders all regression 
equations have been re-estimated adding two new explanatory variables. The 
first variable is equal to the sum in percentage of the voting rights held by all 
shareholders who have more than 5 percent of the votes. To capture the 
interaction effect between the dummy variables (PROTEC*, D) and ownership 
by large shareholders, two new variable have been added that equals the 
ownership variable multiplied by the dummies. The ownership variable is 
negative in all cases except when the performance measure is stock return 
and thus far from being significantly different from zero. This is also the case 
with the two new variables that model the interaction effect. But, more 
importantly, adding new variables to control for ownership effects does not 
change the significance of the variables in any of the cases. The 
interpretation is that ownership structure does not significantly influence 
corporate financial performance and, even more importantly, does not  
significantly change the previous obtained results (See Voetmann and 
Neumann (1999) who find that ownership concentration does not influence 
share price movements on the Danish stock market).  
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Since Danish law does not oblige managers to report their holdings of equity 
in the firm, it is difficult to control for insider ownership. Reformulating the 
definition of an effectively protected firm by expanding the definition to 
include firms where the corporate charter requires a temporarily suspension 
of the voting rights do not alter the results significantly either. Financial 
performance measures are sensitive  to the selected accounting standards 
which to some degree is up to the management’s discretion. Danish 
accounting regulation allows that goodwill for acquisitions may be 
depreciated directly of the equity. To evaluate this impact on performance 
both the balance sheet and the income statement have been adjusted. This 
is because such a method could change a company’s profitability and 
financial leverage extensively without this change is due to any changes in 
the company’s economic conditions. The method can only be justified if the 
buyer afterwards recognizes that the price was too high. For companies that 
have depreciated the goodwill for acquisitions directly of the equity, the 
annual accounts have therefore been adjusted in the following way. Any 
amount of goodwill is added back to the equity and instead placed under the 
assets. However, conduction of these adjustments and re-estimating the 
equations do not change the results significantly. 
The results in this section do not show that corporate financial performance 
significantly depends on whether firms are effectively protected or not. This 
is also confirmed if one ignores the mentioned problems of causality and 
conducts single regression estimations of equation (1) and thus allowing for 
heteroscedastic standard errors (see White (1980)) i.e. PROTEC is not 
significantly from zero in any of the cases. Estimating the second equation 
(2) individually using a probit model does not either show that the 
probability of being effectively protected significantly depends on firm 
performance.  
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8. Discussion of the results 
 
All the results show that unprotected firms do not outperform protected 
firms. One plausible reason could be that protected firms are subject to 
other corporate governance mechanisms than a market for corporate control.   
Protected firms could instead be monitored by large blockholders including 
institutional investors or holders of debt. This is especially the case for bank 
oriented economics that relies less on equity finance.   
Another reason why unprotected firms do not outperform protected firms 
could be that the unprotected firms are more shortsighted, e.g. by having 
lover R & D costs or making less investments that negatively effects 
performance in the long run (see Stein (1988) for a formal model of this 
view). Takeover defenses could also give management incentives to invest 
more in firm specific human capital, thereby boosting performance.   
However, even if companies were not protected by various takeover defenses 
a market for corporate control would not easily arise on the Danish stock 
market, thereby making the threat of a contested takeover almost illusory. 
This could explain why unprotected companies do not outperform protected 
companies, because the threat of a hostile takeover is almost non-existing. 
There are several reasons. A market for corporate control requires a very 
liquid capital market and it is rather doubtful if this condition is fully 
satisfied in Denmark and other small European countries.  
The rules concerning mandatory tender offer in the Danish Securities Act, 
which is based on EU-directives, could also constrain the functioning of 
such a market for control. According to the Danish Securities Act (c.f. § 31) 
the price a bidder has to pay to the rest of the shareholders when he both 
obtains control and has one third of the shares, is equal to the highest price 
he paid to obtain one third of the shares. This will eventually make it more 
expensive for a potential bidder to get control of the whole company, which 
could deter him from such an action in the first place.  
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Thus, since managing directors very often are members of the board in other 
listed companies it is likely that a bidder would not be tempted to make a 
hostile takeover in the first place. Making an attempt of a contested takeover 
could violate an unwritten collegiate agreement. Hence, refraining from a 
takeover would be a rational act since all board members are better off 
without a market for corporate control which is not even pursued by 
powerful groups of shareholders. A higher degree of orientation towards 
stakeholder mentality of board members could also constitute an 
impediment of successful bids (on third of the board members are selected 
by employees ). Board members in Danish firms may not only take possible 
benefits of shareholders into consideration in a takeover situation but 
probably also other stakeholders, including the protection of their own 
personal interests. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms mainly consist of dual-class 
voting rights combined with foundation ownership. Almost one third of the 
management in Danish firms is effectively protected against contested 
takeovers, hereby insulating management from the market for corporate 
control. Thus, the article illustrates that the EU proposal set forth in the 5th 
Directive of one share-one vote will, if implemented, have serious 
consequences for ownership structures in which trust dominants are 
conducted through the use of dual class voting rights.  
The article tests the hypothesis that unprotected firms outperform firms that 
have adopted effective takeover defenses. The article uses four common 
corporate financial performance measures; Tobin’s Q, share return, return 
on asset and return on equity. To deal with the problem of causation 
between the dependent and independent variables the article uses 
simultaneous equation estimation as proposed by Heckmann (1978), but 
does not find that unprotected firms outperform protected firms.  
 27 
Possible explanations have been suggested, including that other factors 
could discipline management in protected firms, e.g. a high degree of debt 
finance or legal protection of shareholders. However, even without the 
existence of any takeover defenses, small stock exchanges like the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange does not satisfy the preconditions for such a 
market for corporate control, making the threat of a takeover non-credible. It 
is also possible that the use of takeover defenses might give management 
incentives to invest more in human capital or be more oriented towards  
long-term investments.  
A highly relevant question is whether or not the results obtained from 
Denmark can be generalized to other European stock exchanges is which 
needs to be solved in order to get a better understanding of the U.S. inspired 
proposal of one share- one vote principle set forth by the European Union.  
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Appendix A:  Table VIII, Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 TOBIN'S Q ROA  ROE  RETURN PROTEC FOUND DUALCL SALES BOOKME
Q 
TOBIN'S Q 1,00         
ROA  0,66 1,00        
ROE  0,11 0,31 1,00       
RETURN 0,15 0,19 0,08 1,00      
PROTEC -0,01 0,04 0,04 -0,01 1,00     
FOUND -0,05 0,01 0,03 -0,18 0,21 1,00    
DUALCL  -0,12 -0,15 0,08 -0,10 0,29 0,31 1,00   
SALES  0,06 -0,02 0,03 0,15 0,19 0,00 0,00 1,00  
BOOKMEQ -0,42 -0,25 -0,04 -0,14 0,21 0,08 0,20 -0,13 1,00 
 
 
Appendix B: Calculations of estimations 
 
In order to estimate equation (1) we start by generating instruments from a 
probit model with D as the dependent variable with all four predetermined 
variables as independent variables. Let y1i  denote PERFORM and y*2i 
PROTEC*. Next step is to calculate the following expression; 
 
222211½
22
*
2 ˆˆ pp
w ii
i XX
y
+=                                                      (3) 
 
iX1 is a 102 ´ 2 matrix consisting of observations from the variables SALES 
and BOOKMEQ for each firm. iX 2 is a 102  ´ 2 matrix consisting of 
observations of the variables DUALCL and FOUND. The vectors i1pˆ  and i2pˆ  
are equal to the estimates obtained from the probit model of the four 
variables yielding (0.0006, 1.25266) and (0.62706, 0.40028) respectively. The 
denominator in expression (3), ½22w  comes from the reduced form variance 
and serves to normalize the estimate. To get the fitted values of the probit 
model, the values in expression (3) is transformed by the standard normal 
cumulative density function Equation (1) is then estimated by the following 
expression: 
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      ( ) )ˆ()ˆ(ˆˆ ½22*2½22*2*111*1½22*21111 --- -+-++++= wwgbegwba iiiiiiiii yyPDyPXy ,         (4) 
 
where iPˆ  is the fitted values from the probit. Expression (4) yields unique 
consistent estimates of the parameters and where the last three terms are 
residuals. To get the estimates of equation (2) we use expression (1b’) in 
Heckmann (1978) page 944 which is equal to: 
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The left hand of equation (5) is denoted dPERFORM and the coefficients 
below is obtained by dividing the regression coefficients by - *2gˆ . The matrix 
X2i contains a constant and the variables DUALCL and FOUND. 
 
Appendix C:  table IX, Estimations of Equation (5) 
 
                            dReturn          dTobin’s Q             dROA              dROE 
 
  Constant             0.089                0.174                0.086              0.115 
                            (0.004)              (0.000)               (0.000)            (0.005) 
   
  DUALCL             -5.967              -3.081                 1.557             -6.779 
                            (0.598)              (0.322)               (0.904)            (0.531)     
 
  FOUND             -16.320             -2.778                 15.657            -0.951 
                            (0.106)              (0.314)                (0.175)           (0.921)   
 
  g*2                      -0.559               0.341                  0.202             0.684   
                           (0.765)               (0.004)                (0.048)           (0.833) 
 
  F sig. Level         0.27                   0.01                     0.07              0.09   
 
  Adj. R2                0.04                  0.10                     0.07               0.04 
 
(significance level in parentheses) 
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Even though y*2i (PROTEC*) is significantly different from zero in two 
situations one can not make a clear interpretation of equation (5) since the 
estimated coefficients depend on each other. The sole purpose in the article 
is the first equation and the second equation serves more as an auxiliary 
equation to estimate the first one. 
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Notation: F(trust ownership in %), VL(voting limitation in %), OL(ownership limitation in %), 
CL(clause of interests), AP(approval of transfer of A shares), PR(Preemptive rights of A 
shares), SU(suspension of voting rights), AS(votes of A shares in %), ¾( supermajority voting 
rights): 
COMPANY 
AARHUS OLIEFABRIK A 
AALBORG PORTLAND H B 
AARSLEFF PER(98/99): F(45%) 
ALBANI BRYGGERI B: F(22,7%) 
AMBU INTERNATIONAL B(98/99) 
BANG & OLUFSEN H B(98/99) 
BHJ INDUSTRI:F(25%) 
BORDING F.E. 
BRYGGERIGRUPPEN: VL(10%),CI 
CARLI GRY  
CARLSBERG B(98/99): F(55%),3/4 
CHEMETALIC B(98/99): AP(A),AS(70,6%) 
CHEMINOVA Holding: F(47%) 
COLOPLAST B(98/99): AP(A),AS(45%) 
COLOR PRINT(98/99) 
CUBIC MODULSYSTEM B(98/99): AP(A),AS(55%) 
DANISCO(98/99): SL(7,5%),CI 
DENKA HOLDING: PR(A).AS(51%) 
DANSK DATA ELEKTRONIK B: AP(A), AS(64%) 
DANSKE TRÆLASTKOMPAGNI 
DANTAX RADIOINDUSTRI B: AP(A), AS(34%) 
DSV B: VL(1,8% A),AS(35%) 
EGETÆPPER B: F(52%),PR(A),SU 
EUROCOM 
FALCK: OL(15%),CI,AP(A) 
FLS INDUSTRIES B 
FLUGGER B(98/99) 
FREDGAARD RADIO(98/99) 
G. FALBE-HANSEN: F(16%),SU 
GLUNZ & JENSEN B(98/99): F(17%),AP(A),AS(5,7%) 
GN STORE NORD: VL(7,5%),CI 
GVP INDUSTRI B(98/99) 
GYLDENDALS BOGHANDEL: F(32,2%) 
HANSEN CHR. HOLDING B(98/99): F(59%) 
HARBROES BRYGGERI B(98/99): AP(A),SU,AS(61%) 
HARTMANN BRDR. B: F(58%),AP(A),AS(57%) 
HEDEGAARD P. PEDER 
HLJ INDUSTRI: F(29,3%) 
HØJGAARD H. B: F(53%) 
HYGÆA-FARVER OG LAKKER 
HOFFMANN & SØNNER B: F(30,8) 
ICOPAL 
INCENTIVE: ¾ 
IN WEAR GROUP 
ISS INT. SERVICE SYSTEM B 
ITH 
JACOB HOLM & SØNNER 
JAMO(98/99) 
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JULIUS KOCH(98/99): F(92,7%) 
JUNCKERS INDUSTRIER 
KLEE BRDR. B: PR(A),AS(24%) 
KORN OG FODERSTOF KOMPAGNIET 
KOMPAN: PR(A),SU,AS(72%) 
KØBENHANVS LUFTHAVNE: OL(10%),CI 
LIC ENERGY 
LINAB 
LOUIS POULSEN: PR(A),SU,AS(54%) 
MARTINGRUPPEN (98/99) 
MIRCO MATIC B(98/99): AP(A),AS(55%) 
MIGATRONIC 
MONBERG & THORSEN H. B: F(21%),PR(A),AS(61%) 
NEG MICON 
NKT HOLDING 
NORDISK SOLAR: F(50,1%) via Solar Hold. 
NOVO NORDISK B: F(68,4%), PR(A),AS(63%) 
NTR HOLDING B: F(31,4%) 
NØRHAVEN: PR(A),AS(64%) 
OBEL C.W. B: F(70%) 
OBJECTIVE B 
OBTEC 
OVE ARKILD B: F(6,5%),AP(A),SU,AS(59%) 
RADIOMETER B(98/99): AP(A),SU,AS(61%) 
RANDERS REB: F(24,2%) 
RIMAS - HEDEN HOLDING(98/99): F(46%) 
ROBLON(98/99): PR(A),SU,AS(65%) 
ROCKWOOL INTERNATIONAL: F(27,2%) 
ROYAL SCANDINAVIA(98/99) 
SAMSON TANGE MASKINFABRIK(98/99) 
SANISTÅL 
SATAIR(98/99) 
SCHOUW & CO B: F(16%) 
SCANBOX(98/99) 
SDC DANDISC 
SIS INTERNTIONAL(98/99) 
SJÆLSØ GRUPPEN 
SKAKO 
SOPHUS BERENDSEN B 
SPÆNCOM(98/99: SU 
SUPERFOS 
SØNDAGSAVISEN 
TELE DANMARK: OL(9,5%), CI, AP(A) 
THRIGE-TITAN B: F(80,2%) 
TIVOLI(98/99) 
TOPSIL 
VEJEN TRÆLAST: F(9%) 
VESTAS WIND SYSTEMS 
VEST WOOD MØBLER(98/99) 
VT HOLDING B 
WESSEL & VETT(98/99): ¾ 
WEWERS TEGLVÆRKER: F(22,9%),SU 
WILLIAM DEMANT HOLDING: F(66%) 
ØSTASIATISK KOMPAGNI 
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